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In the midst of Ukraine’s ongoing political negotiations to create a new 
government, a number of worrying signs for the country’s potential investors 
have gone almost unnoticed internationally. During the last two weeks, an 
independent US energy firm chose to leave the country, while a military-style raid 




On 30 October, Cardinal Resources plc announced plans to sell its Ukrainian 
assets. The US-owned corporation was one of the first independent oil and gas 
exploration firms to invest heavily in Ukraine 10 years ago, drawing largely from 
US investors. Its experience speaks volumes about the difficulties of working in 
an environment that provides no legitimate avenues for influence on government 
decisions and no clear rule of law. 
 
According to Cardinal CEO Robert Bensh, his company’s exit from the country is 
necessary because government price controls and increased fees make it 
impossible to earn a profit – or even to break even. The company, he said, “can’t 
generate any revenue because of capped prices.” (1) 
 
Bensh said the sale of the company’s interests was the only viable option 
available, with bankruptcy protection being the company’s sole alternative. (2) 
The Kuwait Energy Corporation (KEC), which bought Cardinal’s assets for $71 
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million, will take over the company’s share in the operation of four gas fields and 
three licenses in Ukraine. 
 
According to those close to the operation, Cardinal had intended to invest 
roughly $100 million in further exploration, in an attempt to increase Ukraine’s 
domestic gas production. The country now depends on Russia’s Gazprom for 
85% of its gas. KEC likely will move forward with these plans, after a pause to 
allow more favorable conditions to develop. Investors are waiting, said Bensh, 
and are hopeful for more favorable conditions under the new government, which 
should be confirmed by mid-November. Regulations have “stopped most foreign 
investment” in the energy field, leaving the country “18 months behind” where it 
would have been, he said. (4) 
 
Decree 31 
Cardinal’s difficulties began in December 2006, when Ukraine’s government 
included a new regulation for international and domestic businesses in its 2007 
state budget. The regulation specifies that all companies in joint-ventures with 
state-owned enterprises must sell their products to one state-designated 
company at a fixed price. (5) 
 
In February 2007, Ukraine’s government enacted the widely condemned “Decree 
31.” This measure forces energy companies like Cardinal to sell its product to the 
state-owned Naftohaz Ukrainy, at a price set by Naftohaz Ukrainy. The price 
offered was approximately $1.50 mcf (1 mcf=1,000 cubic feet). This price is 
almost 300 times lower than the market price of around $4 mcf for which Cardinal 
sold its product in 2006, before the new regulations. It is also below Cardinal’s 
production costs of $1.70 mcf. (6) 
 
At the same time, the cabinet raised taxes and royalties on profits for most 
companies operating in Ukraine to 30%-50% of gross profits. It, therefore, 
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became impossible for Cardinal and other similar companies to break even, let 
alone to make a profit. 
 
In response, Cardinal repeatedly met with Ukraine’s officials, including Fuel and 
Energy Minister Yuriy Boiko, to urge them to rescind Decree 31 and return to 
market pricing. Cardinal representatives also say they sought assistance from 
US government officials, but to no avail. 
 
Another oil and gas exploration firm, Europa Oil and Gas plc, went to court 
following the passage of Decree 31. The company won its case based on 
Ukrainian legislation governing foreign investment that guarantees the right to 
sell at market prices. The court ruled that the company could sell its gas at 
market prices, but it has been reported that the government is simply ignoring the 
ruling. (7) 
 
In response, several production companies attempted to stop selling their gas 
domestically, pumping it into storage instead. Cardinal received information, 
however, that its gas has been taken from storage by Naftohaz Ukrainy. The 
company has been unable to confirm this report. (8) 
 
Bensh and others interviewed for this article suggest several reasons for the 
government’s actions: 
 
First, Decree 31 was passed during the pre-election season. By capping gas 
prices, Yanukovych could guarantee low domestic prices for a limited time. The 
increased taxes also could be used to help maintain budget expenses, which 
ballooned prior to the election. 
 
Second, some suggest that companies like Cardinal and Europa have been 
caught in a larger struggle between Ukrainian business interests for control of 
both Ukrnafta, Cardinal’s state-owned joint venture partner, and the country’s 
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overall gas network. The gas network is Ukraine’s most lucrative asset, 
generating up to a quarter of the country’s GDP. 
 
Ukrnafta 
In 2006, Ukrnafta produced 70% of Ukraine’s total oil and gas condensate and 
16% of its natural gas output, according to a May 2007 report from Dragon 
Capital. (9) 
 
Although the state owns a 50% + 1 share in Ukrnafta, it has been de facto 
controlled by Pryvatbank (a subsidiary of the Pryvat Group), which technically 
owns only 42%. The CEO of Pryvatbank/Group, Ihor Kolomoisky, controls the 
Ukrnafta board and most of its assets. This is thanks to former President Leonid 
Kuchma, who reportedly allowed Pryvat “free rein in directing Ukrnafta,” and who 
allowed Kolomoisky to install personnel loyal to him. (10) 
 
Those close to the situation suggest that Yanukovych’s government may have 
attempted to dilute Kolomoisky’s control over Ukrnafta through various 
techniques, in order finally to assert the state’s majority interest. Those 
techniques appear to include minimizing Ukrnafta’s profits through Decree 31.  
 
According to Ukrainian investment firm Concorde Capital, Ukrnafta has suffered 
significantly from the price caps imposed by Decree 31 and by an increase in 
their tax and royalty payments to 50%. Like Cardinal, Europa and others, 
Ukrnafta has been unable to profit from sales of its product. The company 
reported a 48% year on year drop in 9M EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization). (11) 
 
Kolomoisky vs. Firtash 
This drop in revenue has allowed fellow oligarch Dmitro Firtash to gain a foothold 
in Kolomoisky’s interests. Firtash controls the gas distribution company 
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Ukrgazenergo—a subsidiary of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo—and Ukrnafta’s 
direct competitor. His interests are primarily co-owned with Russia’s Gazprom. 
 
Firtash has pushed in the last year to dominate Ukraine’s entire gas system, from 
extraction to production to distribution. The government’s new regulations have 
(possibly unintentionally) assisted him, as his international gas sales have 
cushioned his companies from the cap on domestic prices. (12) 
 
All of this reportedly has forced Kolomoisky into a deal. Firtash now is said to 
have taken over the controlling share of Ukrnafta. This information could not be 
confirmed. If it is true, one company, backed by Russia, may now control 
Ukraine’s entire gas system, with only the pipelines remaining clearly under state 
control. The most important effect of Decree 31 may be a lessening of the 
already limited competition that existed in the gas sector. 
 
The political response 
This is an issue that likely will be one of the first on the agenda of the new 
Ukrainian government of Yulia Tymoshenko. At an investor event in September, 
Tymoshenko suggested that the state must create more effective competition in 
the energy field. She also stated that she would initiate a complete overhaul of 
business regulations, with many simply being removed. In particular, when asked 
about “Decree 31,” she said, “Without question, that has to go. It can’t remain. It’s 
not a complicated issue.” Further, “We need market mechanisms.” (13) 
 
Tymoshenko and her allies also have expressed concern at the increasing 
number of “corporate raids” on large companies, and the effect of these raids on 
the energy market. The raids have affected at least two of the country’s oil 
refineries, as businesses fight for control of production capacity.  
 
The raid on Kremenchug 
Just two weeks ago, a group of “private security guards in camouflage uniforms” 
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arrived at the Kremenchug Oil Refinery, located in Ukraine’s Poltava Oblast, and 
physically took control of the plant. The CEO who has run the plant since 2004 
was removed, while the former CEO (from 2004) was reinstated. The Ukrtatnafta 
corporation, which is largely owned by Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan and which 
controls the plant, immediately stopped supplying the refinery with oil. (14) 
 
Since the refinery provides up to 50% of all domestic oil products, the price for 
petrol and other oil products in Ukraine has begun to increase. 
 
Pavlo Ovcharenko, the CEO reinstalled by armed guards, claims he was 
reinstated to the position thanks to a court order. That court—located in another 
oblast—reportedly ruled that 18% of the shares in Ukrtatnafta, which are 
controlled by companies friendly to Tatarstan’s interests, should be transferred to 
the state, giving it control. 
 
Corporate raiding and corruption 
In its report “Corruption, Democracy and Investment in Ukraine,” The Atlantic 
Council of the United States identified “raiding” as one of the key areas of 
corruption in the country. (15) Various sources suggest that, in the last two years, 
from 2,000-3,000 raids have occurred against major corporate entities. In 
essence, the money (or to be blunt, bribes) reportedly paid for court decisions 
and for the passivity of law enforcement officials, which facilitates the raids, 
undermines the country’s entire system of rule of law. 
 
During a telephone conference call on 28 October, former (and likely future) 
Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk (BYUT) identified both arbitrary regulations and 
corporate raiding as the largest detriments to foreign investment in Ukraine. “The 
goal [of the new government] is to give all investors access, and we would also 
like to introduce legislation to prevent further spreading of raiders’ attacks, 
against which ordinary investors are defenseless.” (16) 
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Despite all of these concerns, foreign investors continue to express interest in 
Ukraine, and the economy continues to perform well, given the pressures on it, 
growing at least 6% per year. The number of small and medium businesses in 
the country is steadily increasing, as they generally are untouched by the battles 
raging over Ukraine’s largest assets, while market mechanisms show signs of 
taking root in many sectors. 
 
Cardinal Resources’ Robert Bensh said he is “encouraged” by the country’s 
prospects. Most who have suffered losses because of arbitrary decisions or 
unworkable fees also seem to believe that these issues can be addressed, even 
though valuable time and momentum already has been lost. Large investors say 
they are waiting, but not turning away. It will be up to Ukraine’s next government 
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